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M others, Other Mothers, 
and Others 
The Legal Challenges and Contradictions 
of Lesbian Parents 
 






My title derives its inspiration in part from the end-of-day watch sounded for 
my daughter by another child at her day-care centre when I arrived to pick her 
up:'. . . your mo1n's here-the other one.' As I think back to tha t moment more 
than half a decade ago, I remember with fondness the ease with which my 
daughter's little friends were able to assimilate that she didn't have a daddy, 
but rather two mommies-even the competitive little girl who said, 'Oh yeah, 
well I have about 10 mommies.' 
Too, I recall a yet earlier conversation with one of my feminist intellectual 
heroes (who was then on the cusp of a post-modern turn). I shared with my 
colleague that I found it interesting yet odd that I, a lawyer turned legal acade- 
mic, did not have what I regarded as a legal relations hip with the new baby in 
my life. My colleague responded that perhaps that was a good thing, perhaps 
that was better; after all, why would I want to, need to, acquiesce to law 's 
power to define and regulate. To be frank, as unsettled as I was by the contra- 
dictory nature of my own position, I was troubled by her response. I mu ttered 
my well-worn rejoinder that I thought legal relations and regulation were more 
complicated than that. 
In the years following this conversation, as Brenda Cossman (1994) has 
noted elsewhere, brave lesbians and gay men are now taking their lives to 
court to challenge and resist homophobic discrimination. A community of 
people who scarcely, if ever, experienced the law as a shield has taken it up as 
a sword to advance and vindicate equality claims. To even the most casual 
observer, the successes and near misses of lesbian and gay litigants and law 
reformers illustrate that a significant social and political shift has been 
achieved over the last decade. In this shift, lesbians and gay n1en have 
savoured victories as of ten as they have endured defeats. To be sure, not every 
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lesbian litigant would embrace the characterization of 'success' or 'victory'. In 
some of the litigation where lesbian former partners have squared off against 
each other, one lesbian's victory has been another lesbian's loss. Even more 
amazing, out lesbian and gay lawyers are appearing as counsel in some of 
these cases. Of this phenomenon, Laura Benkov has suggested that 'the past 
and present are colliding in the courtroom· (1994: 37). These are interesting 
times in which to be a student of law, gender relations, and social change. 
There are, nonetheless, notes of caution to be sounded at the prospect of 
litigating one's way to social transformation. I count myself numbered among 
those who are dubious about the nature and endurance of the successes that 
can be experienced in the courtroom (Gavigan, 1992; see also Fudge. 1991; 
Glasbeek, 1989; Fudge and Glasbeek, 1992). 
In this chapter, 1consider what is meant when we think of law as a 'gender- 
ing strategy' (Smart, 1992) in relation to lesbian parents and the varied 
relations and encounters with law that lesbians with child ren have. I identify 
and engage critically with two themes in lesbian legal scholarship: (1) that 
lesbians are 'outside' the law, and (2) that lesbian n1others are mothers just 
like other mothers. I examine four different forms of lesbian child custody 
litigation to illustrate that the characterization of 'inside/outside' the law does 
not fully capture the complexity of lesbians in relation to the law, as well as to 
illustrate the complexity (and not infrequently the fragility) of lesbian relation- 
ships to children in their lives. In this chapter, then, I hope to illustrate the 
importance of theorizing Jaw when theorizing its contribution to gender 
relations, and lesbian engagement with both . 
Theme I : Lesbians Inside/Outside  Law? 
At the outset, 1 concede that I find troubling many themes in lesbian writing 
and scholarship in relation to law, and here I include my own modest contri- 
bution to the literature. One then1e in lesbian writing about law is that lesbians 
are 'outside' the law (Arnp, 1995; Robson, 1992). The evocative cri de coeur 
of the prominent American lesbian essayist, Minnie Bruce Pratt-'how I love is 
outside the J aw ' (1991: 228; cited by Arnup, 1995: 378)-is powerful, haunt- 
ing, almost irresistible. My response (rather too cryptic, I now see) has been to 
assert: 'Lesbians do not live outside the law in a kind of legal limbo, nor do 
they exist in a legal vacuum. They shape and are shaped by the legal and social 
relations in which they live' (Gavigan, 199Sa: 103) . 
In this chapter, I hope to illustrate that both positions need to be revisited, 
rethought. Af ter all, lesbians who have been married, lesbians who have had 
children with men, and lesbians who have given birth to children or who have 
adopted children-t hese lesbians are not 'outside the Jaw'. They can't 'opt out' 
(Brophy and Smart, 1985: 1) . They live in relation to law; even when they leave 
the marriages, their legal relationships do not end. Rather than have her 
children dragged through an ugly custody battle at the instance of their father 
(with her mother as a character witness for him). Minnie Bruce Pratt (1991: 
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231) left them with him, 'reclaiming' her relationship with them when they 
were older: 
 
I could have stolen them and run away to a place where no one knew them, 
no one knew me, hidden them, and tried to find work under some other name 
than my own. I could not justify taking them from all their kin, or their father 
in this way. Instead, from this marriage I carried away my clothes, my books, 
some kitchen utensils, two cats. I also carried away the conviction that I had 
been thrust out into a place of terrible loss by laws laid down by men. In my 
grief, and in my ignorance of the past of others, I felt that no one had 
sustained such a loss befo re. . . . I became obsessed with justice. (Ibid., 44-S) 
 
When Minnie Bruce Pratt made the excruciating decision not to challenge her 
husband's assertion of custody of their sons, she had been snared already in 
the complex sticky web of family and law that touches every married woman 
and mother. 
But for some lesbians, it may be possible to say: 'How I love (and whom I 
love) is outside the law.' And here, I am thinking of some of the cases 
involving American lesbians who have been told by former partners or their 
families, and then by the courts, that they are not parents to the children they 
have been raising. In legal terms, these lesbians, and some others who have 
attempted to adopt their partners' children, are told that they do not have 
'standing'-no legal interest in or right to assert in relation to the children. 
They are not mothers; they are not parents. Their relationships do not amount 
to parental or familial relations. But, as I will illustrate below, even this 
is subject to challenge and change; the law here is uneven. 
Another implicit theme in feminist legal literature suggests that lesbians 
have been constructed as the archetypical bad mothers of legal discourse, and 
as a result, always at risk in the face of a disapproving legal system (e.g., 
Arnup, 1989, 1995). In her recent explication of the shifting nature of mater- 
nalist ideology in law, Susa n Boyd has carefully analysed how three important 
·access' issues in child custody litigation have been articulated. And while the 
issue of sexual orientation in access is not central to her piece, Boyd intimates 
that law's fear of single mothers means that lesbians can anticipate 'harsher 
evaluations' by judges (1996a: 504). However, while the obsessive fury of 
husbands often seems insatiable, recent experiences of lesbians in Canadian 
courtrooms suggest less predictable, less certain results. 
It seems to me that we can no longer assert generally or with confidence that 
lesbians are in or out of the law or on the wrong side of the legal tracks; it is 
import ant to identify, illustrate, and analyse the varied and changing, indeed, 
contradictory ways in which the law relates to lesbians and lesbians to the law. 
Important shifts, and the not infrequent victory, however partial, fragile, and 
costly it may be, need to be acknowledged (and understood). Some of the cases 
I discuss below are illustrative of these shifts and contradictions. 
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Theme U: Lesbians 'Unmodified'-- Mothers or Parents? 
One question that has vexed me before is: 'What makes a woman a mother?' 
(Gavigan, I 995a: 107). Here I modify i t to ask: 'What makes a lesbian a 
mother?' Are lesbians 'mothers just like others' (Arnup, 1989)? Always? The 
commentary on the earliest reported lesbian custody cases stressed, in the face 
of patriarchal wrath and judicial apprehension, that lesbian mothers were not 
demons but mothers, 'just  like others'. The importance of this contribution 
cannot be overstated; Amup broke lesbian ground in  feminist legal literature at 
a time when few scholars and lawyers could bring themselves to say the word 
'lesbian' out loud. However, new and emerging forms of litigation indicate that 
many lesbian mothers are  not like other mothers: there are no fathers or 
husbands, no lesbian mothers being aspersed because of their sexual orienta- 
tion, but rather two women who have come together or who have come apart. 
But what does it mean to have two mothers? The language of 'mother' is 
seldom unmodified: birth 1nother, adoptive mother, real 1nother, bad mother, 
good mother, lesbian mother. . . . The term 'mothe r' implicitly invites invoca- 
tion of the term 'father ', as if this dyad is natural and inevi table. that a child 
must have one of each. Lesbian couples involved in parenting and child-rearing 
themselves seem to cede some primacy to the (birth/ natural/real) mother : the 
non-birth/' social' mother may be called the co-m other (Williams. 1995: 109), 
the other mother  (Adams. 1995; Nelson. 1996:  85). the second mother 
(Fleming, 1995), the co-mom (Czyscon, l 995) , step-parent (Rounthwaite and 
Wynne, 1995: 87), or stepmother (Nelson, 1996:84). Where a child was born 
or adopted into a lesbian relationship, the women seem to regard themselves 
as mothers and other mothers. When the child comes with the mot her from a 
previous, usually straight, relationship, the other woman may become 'co- 
parent' or 'co-mom'. The age and acceptance of the child and the nature of the 
father's involvement may also shape th e lesbian co-parent's relationship with 
the child or children (see, e.g., Rounthwaite and ·wynne, 1995). A recent case 
in Ontario (Buist v. Greaves, 1997). which I will discuss below, has pushed this 
issue one step further, by testing the meaning of 'mother ' in the Children's Law 
Reform Act. 1 
 
Engenderi ng Law 
Law as a Gendering Strategy 
In the inaugural issue of the journal Social and Legal Studies, Carol Smart 
(1992) argued that feminist socio-legal scholars ought to shift their inquiry 
f rom earlier .modes and levels of analysis to think now of law as gendered 
(rather than male or sexist) . This analytic distinction is important, she urged, 
because 'the idea of it as gendered allows us to think of [law] in terms of 
processes which will work in a variety of ways and in which there is no relent- 
less assumpt ion that whatever it does exploits women and serves men' (1992: 
33; emphasis added). It is more complicated than that. This has long been a 
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theme in Smart's work (1981, 1985), and her insights have been important and 
influential for many of us in Canada. In this chapter, I take up Smart's invita- 
tion to examine 'How does gender work in law and how does law work to 
produce gender' and to think of law as a 'gendering strategy ' (1992: 35). This 
forn1of inquiry, combined with Smart 's appreciation of the uneven nature and 
development of legal regulation (Smart, 1986) and her injunction against 
feminist instrumentalist analyses, is clearly a fruitful way to proceed. 
One of Jaw's contributions to gender relations, Smart argued, is the 'woman 
of Legal Discourse': the 'gendered subject position which legal discourse brings 
into being· (1992: 34) . It is here where my depanure from Smart begins to 
form. Smart is careful to attempt to avoid ascribing (to borrow from Cain, 1994: 
44) 'causal primacy' to legal discourse: she characterizes law as 'partial author' 
(1992: 39). Nonetheless, her illustrative exemplar (the bad mother) belies her 
own critique of less sophisticated forms of feminist legal analysis. 
The category of bad mother, per Smart, came into being with the enactment 
of draconian criminal legislation that captured 'lewd women' whose newborn 
infants were found dead. These apparently reluctant moth ers were presumed by 
operation of this statute to have murdered their newborn infants unless they 
could produce two witnesses to provide evidence to the contrary (21Jae.I c.27 
(1603)) . This statute was repealed in 1803 by the same statute (Lord 
Ellenborough's Act, 43 Geo.III (1803) ) that made abortion at any stage of 
pregnancy a statutory felony, thus capturing women, married or otherwise, who 
were trying to avoid motherhood (Gavigan, 1984). Smart (1992: 38) delineates 
pieces of legislation that not only ·constructed a category of dangerous mother- 
hood' bu t also widened 'the net of law .. . at precisely the same time as it made 
it increasingly difficult to avoid unmarried pregnancy and childbirth.' There are 
a number of difficulties with Smart's analysis, not the least of which is the 
uneasy fit her discursi ve exempla r, the bad mother, has with her theoretical 
imperative. In other words, Smart's explication of the sixteenth-, eighteenth, 
and nineteenth-century statutes does not illuminate legal 'processes which . . . 
work in a variety of ways and in which there is no relentless assumption that 
whatever [law] does exploits women and serves men' (ibid ., 33) . In fact, a 
broader and closer analysis of the 'dangerous' mothers of infanticide  law 
reveals that this 'legal category' in practice was always unstable and imperfectly 
implemented: juries often refused to convict young women indicted and many 
nineteenth-century judges expressed sympathy for them (Backhouse,  1984b; 
Gavigan,  1984).  Medico-legal  experts devised  'scientific'  tests  to  determine 
whether or not the infant, whose birth had been concealed and whose death 
was alleged to have been caused by maternal murder, had breathed or not-if 
not, the unmarried woman was not caught by the statute (Gavigan, 1984). 
Leav ing aside my own view that a category of (bad) Woman of legal discourse 
might better be illustrated by the experience of unmarried women under the 
English Poor Law (Thane, 1978) or by the women who were convicted of petit 
treason when they killed their husbands (and who experienced scant judicial or 
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public mercy when they were burned at the stake) (Gavigan. 1989-90). l do 
have a deeper theoretical concern: Smart examines only one level of law (legis- 
lation). defines it as 'legal discourse', and thus imposes closure, offering but a 
partial image of that of which law is but a partial author. 
This observation of the contradictory images of women in legal and medico- 
legal discourses, even in the same area of law, is not novel. In her early work 
on the legal construction of women's sexuality, Susan Edwards (1981)  illus- 
trated quite contradictory images of female sexuality in sexual offences: that of 
female sexual passivity in sexual of fence legislation and female sexual precip· 
itation in the legal process. Even in this manifestly gendered area of criminal 
law, there is no one Woman in the legal discourse. 
Thus, l am concerned that the much criticized 'Woman· of conventional 
feminist discourse has been replaced by Smart's 'Woman of legal discourse', 
notwithstanding her own disclaimer: 'It is this Woman of legal discourse that 
feminism must continue to deconstruct but without creating a normative 
Woman who reimposes a homogeneity which is all too often cast in our own 
privileged, white likeness' (Smart, 1992: 39). 
While I accept her admonition, I find Smart's notion of legal discourse to be 
too discursively unidirectional and her Woman of legal discourse to be discur- 
sively unidimensional (and relentlessly exploited as a heterosexual woman) . 
Constituted as she is by {legal) discourse. she has neither experience nor 
agency: she has neither breath nor breadth. In the film A Simple Wish, Ruby 
Dee's character was rendered cartoonishly unidimensional by the flick of a 
hand of Kathleen Turner's wicked fairy godmother. Smart 's Woman of legal 
discourse similarly owes her flattened fate to the somethin.g that has been done 
to her in the 'Toon Town' of legal discourse. 
Again to be clear, I accept much of Sm art 's theoretical contribution. An 
atten1pt to identify. appreciate. and illustrate the complex, uneven, contradic· 
tory, and materially significant nature of law and of family, and of gender 
inequalities, informs my work (Gavigan, 1992, 1993) . In particular, I continue 
to be interest ed in identifying the imases of women in legal discourses and 
practices. These images, including  the images of lesbians, are as uneven, 
incomplete, complex, and contradictory as the law itself. In my interrogation 
of the various lesbian parenting cases, will I find the  'Lesbian of legal 
discourse'? ls there a gendered subject position of lesbian or lesbian parent 
constituted by law? l hope to illustrate, with the aid of Smart's theoretical 
prescription (if not her illustration). legal relations and legal processes that 
'work in a variety of ways and in which there is no relentless assumption that 
whatever [Jaw] does exploits' lesbians. 
 
Law as Practice, Process, and Institution 
The discourse of law does not correspond with everyday thought except in 
those areas of life such as the stock exchange where the legal form has consti· 
tuted what is everyday. (Cain, 1994: 40-1) 
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Access to justice may be defined most narrowly as access to the courts. The 
words uttered in judgment by a court are the product of litigation. The cost of 
access to justice through litigation is prohibitive to all but the most financially 
secure litigant.2 Family law, as traditionally practised, is costly to private 
litigants and legal aid plans alike. Unlike criminal defence work, family law is 
'paper-intensive'3 and thus expensive. This may explain in part what Brenda 
Cossman and Carol Rogerson (1997: 785) found in their recent study: 
 
With the exception of child protection cases, the majority of family law cases 
are not litigated to a resolution. Anecdotally, it is said that between 90 and 95 
percent of family law cases settle at some point in the process prior to a trial- 
whether by an agreement between the parties negotiated by their lawyers 
without recourse to the courts, or by minutes of settlement incorporated into 
a consent order after litigation has been comn1enced, in some cases prior to 
the hearing of the first motion or in others after the first motions, or after a 
settlement  or pre-trial conference. 
 
Access to the courts via litigation is also a question of access to resources, 
which, for many women, are diminishing with the evisceration of legal aid 
plans. Thus, we have a fraction of private family law cases actually litigated 
and resulting in a judicial pronouncement, and fewer still reported. The cases, 
reported or not, that go to trial are those that defy (or in which at least one 
party defies) settlement. 
Susan Boyd has noted with concern that one problem with legal academic 
research focusing on reported cases in family law is that most reported cases 
involve white people. Boyd (1996a: 498) considers that perhaps this may derive 
in part from the fact that 'white people may feel more comfortable than people 
of colour resorting to the court system to resolve family disputes.' Yet, surely 
few litigants go willingly or happily to court and fewer still savour any measure 
of comfort from the process. Who has the resources to participate in the legal 
process, who takes whom to court, and who accepts the legitimacy of judicial 
determinations seem more relevant here. In this process, gender, race, and 
class, power and money, and not infrequently our old friend the state are impli- 
cated. For instance, in April 1997, family court judges reported to the Ontario 
Legal Aid Review that fully 50 per cent of litiga tion in matters of child support 
and child protection is instituted by the state (Ontario Legal Aid Review, I, 
1997: 801) . And, as Minnie Bruce Pratt (1991: 44) learned. one can experience 
legal 'process' without  ever going to court: 
 
I was judged wi th finality. Without my climbing the steps of the courtrooms 
of Cumberland County, I was sentenced. Without facing the judge since my 
lawyer feared that 'calling attention to my lesbian identity' would mean that I 
would never see my children again, I was declared dirty, polluted, unholy. I 
was not to have a home with my children again. I did not die, but the agony 
was as bitter as death. . . . 
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At the heart of this is the very nature of an adversarial legal system in which 
(formally equal) litigants co1nmence their actions and define their issues- 
where these litigants want to win. The courtroom is a site less of principle than 
of tactics, where perceived weaknesses in either party are exploited by the 
other. In all of this, the influential role of lawyers as litigators cannot be 
overstated. The courtroom is the home playing field not only of judges, but of 
legal advocates, whose practice it is to translate and transform social and 
personal struggles and issues into legal discourse (Cain, 1994; Glasbeek, 1989) . 
It is a lawyer who advises the lesbian litigant not to use the word 'lesbian' in 
her affidavit, and it surely is a lawyer who advises an avenging renegade 
husband to sprinkle liberally th e word 'lesbian' tl1roughout his own affidavit. 
Just add 'lesbian', stir, and hope for the best. It is the lawyer who advises the 
lesbian mother how 'out' to be or not be if she wants to win. And thus, it is 
often the lawyer who lacks the courage to 'raise fearlessly every issue'4 on 
behalf of the lesbian litigant or who advises on matters about which she or he 
is less than expert. 
Considered in this light, it is as much a cause for concern as for celebration 
that the ·past and present' collide in the courtroom-a forum in which the 
perspectives and experience of past and present are selected, constructed, 
tailored, emphasized, and ignored at the instance of the contesting litigants in 
their efforts to persuade a trial judge or appellate panel of the 'rightness' of 
their position. But, as been argued elsewhere (see, e.g., Greenwood and Young, 
1976; Thompson, 1975; Hay, 1975; Smart, 1981; Gavigan, 1988, 1992; Chunn 
and Gavigan, 1988), and as I have argued above and hope to illustrate below, 
the law is filled with contradictions; it is nei ther unidimensional nor 
monol i thic. 
 
Lesbians and Their (Legal) Relations 
Lesbians find themselves in four legal contexts in family court. These four 
contexts are not finite or exhaustive. Indeed, at the risk of appearing to invoke 
an essentialist image of lesbians, I am inclined to the v iew that the range of 
contexts is perilously close to infinite given the complexity and diversity of 
political and interpersonal possibilities that characterize lesbian lives. 
 
Lesbians in (Heterosexual) Family Court 
Lesbian and gay custody cases in which straight (former) spouses use sexual 
orientation as a weapon and invoke dominant notions of appropriate parenting 
reveal as much about the social mean ing attached to biological and social 
parenting as they do about the wrath of the 'straight spouse spurned '. The use 
of 'lesbian' and/or 'sexual orientation' as a weapon hearkens back to an earlier 
legal era when 'fault ' was an expressly relevant factor in matrimonial causes, 
such as divorce. In divorce proceedings, evidence of matrimonial 'misconduct' 
or the commission of a 'matrimonial offence' could establish grounds for 
divorce; this evidence was also relevant with respect to collateral issues, such 
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as support and custody. A wife who had deserted her husband or who had 
committed adultery was not entitled to support. Until 1968, a wife's homosex- 
uality in and of itself could not support a husband's divorce petition; however, 
it could be drawn in under the rubric of cruelty. When the federal Divorce Act5 
was enacted in 1968, the grounds for divorce were broadened considerably. 
Many matrimonial 'offences' committed since the celebration of a marriage 
(including having 'engaged in a homosexual act') were articulated in s. 3 to 
support a divorce petition, and even the 'marriage breakdown' provision 
entrenched the significance of fault: the person who deserted t he marriage had 
to wait five years before being able to petition for divorce-s. 4(1) (e) (ii); the 
deserted spouse could petition after three years-s. 4(l) (e)(i). In 1985 the 
Divorce Act6 was amended to eliminate many of the fault-based grounds and 
to limit evidence of (bad) conduct, except where relevant to that person's 
suitability for custody of children. Despite this attempt at formal inhibition of 
allegations of (mis)conduct, some lawyers and their clients continue to be of 
the view that they must 'make her look like a tramp' (or worse) in divorce and 
custody proceedings. 
Susan Boyd  has ably illustrated  that judicial assumptions about normal 
families and lifestyles are firmly rooted. The English case, C. v. C., upon which 
she comments, involved custody litigation over a seven-year-old daughter of 
whom the mother had been the principal parent and caregiver in the first six 
years of the child 's  life.  Af ter the parents separated, the  mother became 
involved in two lesbian relationships, the second of which was more signifi- 
cant and lasting. The father remarried, and in his bid for custody argued that 
he offered a stable, heterosexua l nuclear family and a bigger house. Each 
parent  was foun d by the trial judge to have a loving relationship with their 
daughter, and she was happy in both homes. The trial judge indicated , says 
Boyd, 'if he could choose between an exclusively heterosexual lifestyle and a 
lesbian one, he would favour the "normal'" (1992: 278). But given the close 
bond between the mother and  child, and the fact that the child  would 
inevitably learn that her mother was a lesbian, the trial judge awarded custody 
to the mother and access to the father. On appeal, the Court of Appeal allowed 
the father's appeal and ordered  a  new  hearing, which  ultimately  again 
favoured the mother. Boyd draws out the English judges' uncritical reliance on 
their subjective experience and beliefs and she is not comforted by their recita· 
lion of the 'now routine' declaration that the mother's lesbian relationship was 
not conclusive in deciding the appeal. 
C. v. C. illustrates the context in which lesbian mothers most often (to date) 
find themselves in court defending a custody application by a normal, remar- 
ried ex-husband 7 or (less typically in Canada) by the child 's grandparents .8 As 
recently as July 1992, the British Columbia Supreme Court released a judgment 
in a case (N. v. N.) in which a father relied on the fact of the mother's lesbian 
relationship with an RCMP constable to support his ultimately unsuccessful bid 
f or custody  of their four children.  Both parents had been devout  members of 
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the Salvation Army, and while the trial judge was not certain of the precise 
reason for Mrs N 's 'l apse of faith ', the in ference drawn by her husband impli- 
cated her sexual identity. The trial judge, while not unsympathe tic to Mr N . 
noted that his 'steadfast and unrelenting reference to the gospels had j ust the 
opposite effect on Mrs. N than what he had hoped. Mrs. N established a 
relationship with another woman' (1992: 3). 
The cases involving lesbians and gay men coming out of straight relation- 
ships reveal much about the gendered nature of parenting . For instance, in 
Canada the struggles of gay men in relation to their children tend to manifest 
themselves in reported cases in which a gay father has separated from his wife 
and mother of their children, having wrestled with the discovery and/or accep- 
tance (after marriage) of his sexual orientation. Generally, the legal issue here 
concerns not custody of the children, but rather his right of access to them. and 
more specifically, whether he can have overnight access (see, e.g., W. 11. W., 
1985; D. P.-B. 17. T. P.-B., 1988; Saunders u. Saunders, 1988; Terrzplernan 11. 
Templeman, 1986). Can he have them sleep in the same home where he sleeps? 
Can he have his lover sleep in the house, in his room, in his bed, when his 
children are visiting? Can he defeat the assumption that overnight access in 
these circumstances exposes his children to the 'harmfu l effects of his lifestyle' 
(W. v. W , 1985), and where the merits and presumed 'stability of a sexual ly 
orthodox environment' (S. (1.1.) 11. S. (G.E.), 1989) are preferred without 
question, challenge, or explanation. 
Often, the wife's pain at t he rejection she perceives. and t he disruption she 
has experienced is palpable (e.g., Martini 11. Martini, 1987), but occasionally 
the courts offer us a glimpse of the wid er familial dimensions. In a 1989 
decision of the Newfoundland Supreme Court, in which, as a result of the 
separation, the wife and children became economically dependent on her 
parents and lived in their home, the court expressed a particular concern: 
 
immediate overnight access may have a negat ive affect on the bes t interest of 
the children in this particular case. The maternal grandparents have openly 
expressed to the children their abhorrence of their father's  homosexual 
lifestyle. The mother is economically dependent on her parents and she and 
the children have no choice bu t to reside wi th them at the present time. I feel 
a reasonable time should be given for the grandparents to get used to the idea 
that the father will have overnight access and hopef ully this will give the 
mother an opportunity to find alternative living arrangements. (A.E. 11. G.E.. 
1989: 144) 
 
Husbands, too, continue to hurl the 'lesbian' epithet, both real and 
imagined, at their wives; but they do so with less confidence of vindication by 
the judiciary. One husband in Sault Ste Marie (Tomanec v. Tomanec, 1993) 
inferred that his wife's refusal to be a 'traditional wife' was conclusive 
evidence of both her lesbianism and her mental illness. The court disagreed 
and the wife was awarded custody of the couple's two children. Another suspi- 
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cious husband insisted that his wife could be on the way to initiating a lesbian 
relationship with their five-year-old daughter (Korniakov v. Komiakov , 1997) . 
Judge Main in the Ontario Court, Provincial Division, held that Mr Korniakov 
was incorrect in his conclusion. Custody of the couple's two children was 
awarded to the mother. 
In 1996. the Ontario Court, General Division, was the site of a custody appli- 
cation involving two girls, aged 12 and 13, who had been in their father's 
custody for ll years, pursuant to a separation agreement with their mother 
(Ouellet v. Ouellet, 1997). The father's current partner had been a 'mother 
figure' for the last eight years. Af ter the separation, the mother had two short- 
lived relationships, which produced two more children, and at the time of the 
court hearing, in 1996, she had embarked on her second lesbian relationship. 
The girls expressed a preference to live with their mother (although one of them 
was nervous about what her friends and others would say about her mother 
being a lesbian). The mother applied for custody. At the hearing, the mother 
and the maternal grandparents commended the father's care of the chil dren and 
his ability to facilitate access. The mother won custody, with generous access 
to the father. The parties were to work out the details of access between 
themselves and were told to return to court in a year if they could not work out 
an agreement. With respect to the one daughter's anxiety about her mother's 
sexual orientation, the court noted, 'There was a need, at the present time, for 
support and therapy, if necessary to cope with society's sometimes uneducated 
reflection upon their mother's sexual orientation' (1997 WDFL 092). 
This case buried in the Weekly Digests of Family Law, is interesting. Here, 
we have an almost perfect father who, with his new wife, has raised two girls 
for many years. Their mother has had two other children in the meantime and 
is at the beginning of her second lesbian relationship. And still, the court 
awarded her custody of the children. Clearly, the age and expressed preference 
of the daughters carried weight. But we may be able to infer that the father did 
not make an issue of the mother's lifestyle or sexual orientation, and did not 
ask the court to either. The positions taken by the parties often shape, if not 
determine, the tone and tenor of a judge's judgment. 
The wider familial dimensions in a British Columbia adoption case may 
open yet another window on the limi ts of acceptance of sexual orientation in 
the wider community: here a young lesbian mother was not forced into litiga- 
tion by her child's father; she did not lose custody of her child to an angry 
father. This woman, a single parent, was pressured by her own parents to give 
up her child for adoption because of their insistence that as a lesbian she could 
not raise a child (Adams v. Woodbury. 1986). Some six weeks later, having 
been through counselling, the young mother decided that being a lesbian did 
not preclude being a parent; she attempted unsuccessfully to regain custody of 
her daughter-over the vigorous objections not of her child's adoptive parents 
but of her own parents. 
Some of these cases involving the judicial treatment of lesbians and gay men 
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who leave straight marriages or who run af oul of parents' expectations illus- 
trate what others have noted elsewhere: lesbian and gay parents are at risk in 
the courtroom if they do not conform to dominant notions of appropriate gay 
sexual behaviour: quiet and apolitical. But these cases also illustra te the 
gendered nature of post-separation parenting: for gay fathers, as with most 
fathers, access is their legal issue. Their sexual orientation, as raised by their 
spouses, parents, and in-laws, may be constructed in a way that shapes the 
kind of access arrangements they may have. With respect to lesbians, custody 
of their children continues to be contested and litigated at the instance of the 
men who have been left. And, to borrow from Shakespeare, hell frequently 
hath no fury like a straight spouse spurned. Yet we also see judges declining to 
acquiesce to the husbands and a shift in which judges now not only say that 
the mother's sexual orientation is not determinative of the issue in custody, but 
some of them actually seem to mean it. The fact that they have to say it at all, 
of course, is due to the fact t hat someone has taken the lesbian mother to 
court, has refused to settle, and has litigated the issue. The shift? Litigating 
husbands can no longer be supremely confident of winning. 
 
Lesbians Take Each Other To Family Court: 
Lesbian Mothers and Other Mothers 
Not every lesbian relationship lasts forever. So1ne even unravel with pain, rejec- 
tion, and recrimination. Some lesbians have resisted the label 'spouse' in order 
to avoid responsibility for the children of the relationship. This was the case in 
a British Columbia case. Anderson v. Luoma (see Andrews, 1995; Arnup, 1997; 
Gavigan, 1995) in which Arlene Luoma successfully eschewed any responsi- 
bility for the children who had referred to her as 'their Arlene'. The legal signif- 
icance of this case has always been limited, as it was decided under a particular 
definition in a piece of BC legislation. More recently, the Supreme Court of 
Canada, in M. v. H. (1999) held that the heterosexual definition of spouse (for 
the purpose of spousal support) in the Ontario legislation violated M's equal- 
ity rights under the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. Arlene Luoma 
may well be grateful that she left Penny Anderson where and when she did! 
In many provinces, including Ontario, a parent is defined in fa1nily law legis- 
lation to include someone who has demonstrated a settled intention to treat a 
child as a child of his or her Own family (i.e., 'social parents').9 In Ontario's 
Children's Law Reform Act,10 a parent or any person may apply for custody or 
access to a child-the neutral phrase, 'any person', helping grandparents and 
lesbian social parents alike. The significance of the gender-neutrality, and 
indeed 'familial-neutrality', of these family law provisions should not be 
underestimated or misunderstood. The legislation does not restrict standing in 
child custody cases to parents and thus allows 'third parties' to be heard. This 
apparently arcane legal point is a matter of some consequence to lesbian social 
parents who do not have a biological relationship to a child they may be 
parenting with a biological parent. 
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In Ontario, recently, a lesbian couple who had separated litigated many 
issues as a result of their unravelled relationship (Buist v. Greaves, 1997). One 
of the contested issues between them involved custody of a four-year-old boy 
conceived by alternative insemination during the course of their relationship. 
The biological mother had received an offer of employment in another province 
and she proposed to take the little boy with her. Her former partner sought to 
prevent her from taking the boy with her. One interesting aspect of this case is 
that the social parent asked for a declaration, under s. 4 of the Children's Law 
Reform Act, that she, too, was the mother of the child . While she did not want 
to displace the biological mother, she sought to have her own relationship t o 
the child recognized as that of 'mother' as well. In declining to make the order, 
the trial j udge had this to say: 
 
There is no doubt that the relationship . . . is very close; however, [he] does 
not consider her his mother. Ms Greaves is his mother. He calls her 'mama' 
while he calls Ms Buist 'gaga' which is short for Peggy. He was given Ms G's 
last name at birth. (1997 OJ No 2646 at para 35) 
 
While on the facts of this case, the trial judge may well have come to a 
conventional and defensible conclusion on the issues of custody (to the biolog- 
ical mother), access (to the social parent), and child support (a modest sum to 
be paid by Buist), her route to that conclusion, including her identification of 
these indicia of 'mother', is troubling. The appellation of parents in lesbian 
households may bear little resemblance to or may not share the same meaning 
as in households where the parents are referred to as 'Mommy' and 'Daddy'. 
Similarly, the fact that a child is given the last name of one parent ought not. 
in and of itself, be conclusive of anything. If it is, every mother whose child 
bears the surname of its father has cause for concern. 
The gender- and familial-neutral language of the Ontario legislation allows 
lesbians who are not biological parents to assert claims with respect to the 
children in their lives. And, while Buist v. Greaves offers an illustration of the 
difficulty a lesbian social parent has in asserting an equal claim to motherhood, 
she nonetheless has standing to be considered as a child's parent. Neither 
outside law nor instances of the quintessential bad woman/mother of legal 
discourse, these lesbian cases suggest that finer, more nuanced analytic tools 
need to be deployed to explicate the lesbian victories and lesbian defeats 
experienced here. 
 
Other Mothers and Others: Surviving Lesbian 
(Social) Parents Meet Others in Family Court 
Lesbian parenting cases, combining as they do birth and adoption, fostering 
and social parenting, and multiple possibilities for family forms, also involve 
risks and chances and heartbreak. It is tempting to liken lesbian social parents 
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to tightrope artists who work without a net; a delicate balancing act is 
req uired, and sometimes everything falls. 
In the Michigan case, McG.uffin v. Overton & Porter, a lesbian social parent 
was told by an appellate court that she did not have standing under the state's 
child custody legislation to apply for custody of two boys she had helped to 
raise for eight years. Her life partner, their biological mother, died in January 
1995. Just prior to her death, the deceased mother had executed a will naming 
her partner the guardian of the children. The biological mother indicated that 
she did not want their biological father to have custody because he had estab- 
lished no relationship with them. He was also $20,000 behind in child support 
at the time of her death. Upon receiving notice of the surviving partner's appli- 
cation to be appointed the children's guardian, the father moved swiftly: he 
obtained ex par te orders for custody of each of the boys, and at the end of 
February he collected them from school and had them in his custody. Despite 
the intervention of a children's law clinic urging that the boys be returned to 
the home they had known for the last eight years, the Michigan appeal court 
told Carol Porter that she did not have standing to apply for custody of the 
boys. She would have to recommence her application to be named their 
guardian (a difficult process, notwithstanding the testamentary instrument, 
because the biological father could claim a more direct relationship). 
In another American case, this one in New York, custody proceedings 
involved what the court characterized as 'a unique set of facts' (In the Matter 
of the Guardianship of Astonn H., 1995) . Astonn's mother, Margo, had died a 
month after he was born, never having left the hospital after his birth. Astonn, 
a baby with many special health-care needs, was released from hospital into 
the care of Margo's life partner, Sofia. Sofia applied to be appointed Astonn's 
guardian IO days after her partner's death. As it happened, Margo had been 
married to, but separated from, the father of her older daughter (who was in 
the de facto custody of her husband's mother) . The paternal grandmother 
applied for custody of Astonn, even though her son was not Astonn's biologi- 
cal father. In support of her claim, t he (not quite) paternal grandmother argued 
that the half-siblings should be raised together, and further that as she, 
Ast onn's half-sister, and Astonn shared a common racial heritage, her home 
was the more appropriate for him. The court observed: 
 
In the instant proceeding the court is presented with an extraordinary combi- 
nation of circumstances that must be weighed in determining who would be 
the best caregiver for this child. The importance of race of the caregiver, the 
significance of a party's physical custody of the subject child's half sibling and 
the lesbian relationship between a party and the deceased biological mother, 
including plans they made regarding the child are circumstances unique to this 
proceeding that the court must consider. (1995 WL) 
 
Sofia, the surviving lesbian social parent, was named the child 's guardian and 
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awarded custody, with access to the grandmother and assurances that he and 
his sister would be raised as closely together as possible. 
These  cases suggest  that  biological  ties  between  child  and  parent  or 
caregiver pose the most difficult hurdle facing a lesbian parent. This hurdle is 
insurmoun table in the absence of familial-neutral legislation (such as Ontario' s 
children's legislation). Clearly, these (aspirant) lesbian 1nothers are not 
mothers just like others. While Carol Porter found herself outside Michigan's 
child custody law, this relegation was neither necessary nor inevitable (as the 
experience in Ontario law suggests). 
 
'Playing a Different  Game on the 01.d. Court ': 
Lesbian Couple Adoptions 
IJ1 this last section, I want to examine a 1995 decision of the Ontario Court, 
Provincial Division, Re K., which has been followed by the Ontario Court, 
General Division, in Re C.(E.G.)(No. l ) and Re C.(E.G.)(No. 2) (1995) and in 
several unreported lower court decisions. Effectively, lesbian adoption amounts 
to 'playing a different game on the old court' {Cain, 1994: 42), for the fact of 
adoption can establish legal parenthood for both partners of a lesbian couple. 
In Ontario, in the aftermath of the defeat of Bill 167 and, in particular, in 
response to the last ditch eleventh-hour compromise proposed by the Attorney- 
General (to provide that gay and lesbian couples would not be able to adopt 
child ren) (see Urse!, 1995) , four lesbian couples made joint applications to 
adopt the children they were raising together. In each of the four cases, the 
biological moth er consented to the application by the 'social parent '. However, 
the only way they could make a joint application was to challenge the hete.ro- 
sexual definition of spouse incorporated in Ontario's Child and Family Services 
Act, 12 as only spouses are allowed by that legislation to make a joint applica- 
tion to adopt. Once the 'husband and wife' dyad was struck, the lesbians had 
then to establish themselves as both spouses and parents. 
This they did in admirable fashion. A courageous piece of litigation 
produced a courageous judgment and complete vindication of the position of 
the lesbians before the court: 
 
When one reflects on the seemingly limitless parade of neglected, abandoned 
and abused children who appear in our courts in protection cases daily, all of 
whom have been in the care of heterosexual parents in a 'traditional' family 
structure, the suggestion that it 1night not ever be in the best interests of 
loving, caring and committed parents. who might happen to be lesbian or gay, 
is nothing short of ludicrous. (per Nevins J in Re K. at 708) 
 
The l esbian adoption cases are interesting because they have been test cases in 
the truest sense of the term. They have been litigated by parties who have not 
been hurled into court by an outraged former spouse or parent. Rather, they 
have been marshalled with care and, while there have been many defeats (e.g., 
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Cami lla, N.Y. 1994; Dana, N.Y. 1995), the litigation has also produced some 
startling judicial pronouncements. In a 1993 lesbian  adoption case in New 
Jersey, where a lesbian couple had been in a committed relationship for 10 
years, the biological mother of the child was an executive vice president for a 
large communications company, the household income was in the low six 
figures, and the extended families of both women were d escribed as 
supportive and involved in the f our year old child's life, the trial judge 
concluded : 
 
This case arises at a time of great change and a lime of recognition that , while 
the families of the past may have seemed sin1ple formations repeated with 
uniformity (the so-called 'traditional family') families have always been 
complex, multifaceted, and often idealized .This court recognizes that families 
differ in both size and shape within and among the many cultural and socio- 
economic layers that make up this society. We cannot continue to pretend that 
there is one formula, one correct pattern that should constitute a family in 
order to achieve the supportive, loving environment we believe children 
should inhabit. This court finds that the family before it is providing a secure, 
stable, and nurturing environment for the child. This is to be commended . 
J.M .G. [the adoptive parent) is one of the two cornerstones of this supportive 
home, and beyond all other issues it is upon this factor that t his court primar· 
ily relies in granting this petition for adoption. (per Freed1nan P.J.S.C., Jn the 
Marter of the Adoption of a Child by J.M.G., 1993) 
 
Wit h respect to the issue of homophobia in the broader community, this judge 
observed: 
 
if there is ever any hara ssment or community disapproval, this court should 
have no role in supporting or tacitly approving such behavior. The court's 
recognition of this family unit through the adoption can serve as a step in the 
path towards which strong, loving families of all varieties deserve. (Ibid.) 
 
The next year, in another lesbian adoption case, a New York judge addressed 
the issue of different family forms: 
 
This Court is aware that these cases present family u nits many in our society 
believe to be outside the mainstream of American f amily life. The reality, 
however, is that most children today do not live in so· -called 'traditional' 1950 
television situation comedy type families wi th a stay at ho1ne mother and a 
father who works from 9:00 to  5:00. . . . It is unrealistic to pretend that 
children can only be successfully raised in an idealized concept of family, the 
product of nostalgia for a time Jong past. The family environments presented 
in these adoption cases are warm, loving and supportive, well·suited for the 
nurturance of children. The Court is less concerned for the welfare of these 
adoptive child ren than for many of the children of heterosexual parents \Yho 
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find themselves before the Court. (per Sciolino J., In the Matter of' the Adoption 
of Caitli n and Another (Adoption No. I); In the Matter of the Adoption of Adam 
and Another (Adoption No. 2), N.Y. Fam. Ct, Monroe County, 1994) 
 
In these cases, however, it is not enough for the lesbian social parents to be 
'parents'. In order to make a joint application, and thereby preserve the biolog- 
ical mother's tie to the child(ren), they must also be spouses in Ontario, and 
indeed in every province other than British Columbia. 13 
Thus, as profound as the challenge of lesbian couple adoptions is, it is clear 
that striking down the opposite sex requirement alone does not, cannot, 
address the constraints and familial assumptions embedded in the adoption 
legislation in Ontario. For the lesbian parents to be full parents, they bad to be 
spouses, same-sex spouses to be sure, but spouses nonetheless. Perhaps then, 
there is after all a (new) lesbian of legal discourse: the good spouse. 
 
Conclusion 
In this paper, I have attempted to illustrate the challenges experienced and 
posed by lesbians who parent. There is no one kind of lesbian custody case, 
and no simple or easily predictable judicial response. This also illustrates the 
complex and contradictory nature of law-as discourse and practice-and its 
uneven contribution to gender relations. I have sought to illustrate that legal 
practice, legal and non-legal actors, and legal processes have to be factored into 
any analysis of law as a gendering strategy. 
In many provinces, including Ontario, a parent is defined to include social 
parents (i.e., someone who has demonstrated a settled intention to treat a child 
as a child of his or her own family) . In Ontario, a parent or any person may 
apply for custody or  access to a child-the neutral phrase, 'any person'. 
helping grandparents and lesbian  social parents alike. The significance of 
gender-neutrality, and indeed familial-neutrality , to these family law provisions 
should not be underestimated or misunderstood. Unlike the experience of some 
lesbian social parents in the United States, lesbian partners and social parents 
in Canada get into the front door of the courtroom and are not denied stand- 
ing, custody, or access simply because they are lesbian. I am inclined to think 
that, strategically, the better way for the lesbian social parents to proceed is not 
to press for recognition as 'mother' but rather to continue to push for legisla· 
tion that has opened up the possibility for recognition of the i1nportance of the 
social nature of parenting.  Feminists, lesbians, and mothers ought to move 
away from the ideological (and patriarchal) appeal of 'mother', loosen its grip, 
and continue to breathe lesbian content into the 'person' and 'parent ' of family 
law legislation. 
While it is enormously satisfying to see and hear the gnashing of teeth of the 
self-styled pro-fan1ily right at the thought of lesbian legal victories, lesbian 
adoptions, and the increasing acceptance of lesbian families, it is important 
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that we interrogate and re-examine our places in and positions. on fan1ily law, 
especially when we (at least some of us) win our cases. This may require some 
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